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CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW-IMPORT-EXPORT CLAUSE-POWER OF STATE To 
TAX FOREIGN IMPORTS SUPPLYING CURRENT OPERATING NEEDS-Appellant 
imported from five countries iron ore which was stored at its processing 
plant and drawn upon to fill the current operational needs of the plant. 
When the ore arrived it was originally stored in stock piles containing a 
three-month supply. As needed, ores were conveyed from the stock piles to 
"stock bins," holding one or two days' supply and located in close proximity 
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to the plant, from which the ores were used in the operation of the plant. 
The State of Ohio collected a personal property tax upon all the imported 
ore. In a companion case petitioner imported from Canada lumber and 
wood veneers which were stored at its manufacturing plant in their original 
packages and similarly drawn upon to fill the daily needs of the plant. The 
City of Algoma, Wisconsin, collected a general property tax upon the 
stored lumber and veneers. Both appellant and petitioner challenged the 
taxes, contending their imported materials were immune from state tax-
ation under the clause of the Constitution which prohibits a state from 
taxing "imports." The supreme court of each state sustained the respective 
taxes on the ground that the goods were no longer imports when the tax 
attached and thus not protected by the federal immunity. On appeal and 
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, affirmed, two justices 
dissenting.1 When material is imported for manufacture and indiscriminate 
portions of it are being used to supply the current operating needs of a 
processing plant, the whole of such material is subject to state property 
taxation even though still in its original packages. Youngstown Sheet and 
Tube Co. v. Bowers; United States Plywood Corp. v. City of Algoma, 358 
U.S. 534 (1959). 
The import-export clause of the Constitution prohibits any state with-
out the consent of Congress from laying "Imposts or Duties on Imports or 
Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspec-
tion laws .... "2 In Brown v. Maryland3 Chief Justice Marshall interpreted 
this clause to prohibit state taxation of foreign imports until the goods had 
been sold, or used, or the original package in which they were imported 
had been broken.4 When imported goods are stored in their original pack-
ages awaiting manufacture, they will enjoy immunity for the same reason 
that imports prior to sale are immune: 6 while remaining the property of 
the importer in his warehouse, in the original form or package in which 
they were imported, they have not yet been incorporated into the mass of 
property in the country and still remain distinct as imports.6 But the prin-
cipal cases modify this rule to the extent that the imported goods supply 
the "current operational needs" of the importing manufacturer. Immunity 
then ceases because the imports have entered the manufacturing process.7 
The language of this decision is indicative of an increasing awareness by the 
1 Justices Frankfurter and Harlan dissented. Justice Stewart took no part in the 
consideration or decision of these cases. 
2 U.S. CONST., art. I, §10. For a historical discussion of this clause, see Woodruff v. 
Parham, 8 Wall. (75 U.S.) 123 at 133-136 (1868). 
a 12 Wheat. (25 U.S.) 419 (1827). 
4 Id. at 441-442. See comment, 58 HARv. L. REv. 858 at 863 (1945); 89 L. Ed. 1279 
(1945). 
5 Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945). 
6 Brown v. Maryland, note 3 supra, at 441. 
7 Principal case at 549. 
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Supreme Court that import immunity is not an end in itself but must be 
applied with due regard for the state taxing power and the purposes which 
the import-export clause seeks to achieve.8 
It is significant that the Constitution prohibits only "Imposts or Duties" 
on imports and e:x:ports, for a persuasive argument can be made that a state 
ad valorem property tax does not fall within this prohibition. A property 
tax is- not a tax on imports as such and therefore would still leave the im-
porting process free of state control as the Constitution requires.9 Moreover, 
as one writer has indicated, a property tax is usually regarded as the "quid 
pro· quo" for police and fire protection of goods located in the state, and 
there is no reason to think the Constitution would require that imported 
goods obtain these benefits at the expense of other property subject to tax 
by the state.10 While the Court in the principal cases did not hold that 
state property taxes can reach "imports," it did move significantly in this 
direction by narrowing the scope of goods classified as "imports." It has long 
been held that goods which have entered the process of manufacture lose 
their import immunity.11 As the dissent in the principal cases points out, 
this was generally represented by a physical transformation of the imported 
goods, which is lacking here.12 It would seem, however, that this is purely 
an arbitrary distinction which, while usually present, bears no logical rela-
tion to the time when the state's taxing power should attach. Surely if an 
import sold in its original package without any physical transformation can 
be said to have become subject to_ the taxing power of the state, no good 
s Compare the language of the Court in the principal case at 545, where the problem 
is said to be the practical one "of reconciling the competing demands of constitutional 
immunity of imports and of the State's power to tax property within its borders," with 
that in Low v. Austin, 13 Wall. (80 U.S.) 29 at 34 (1872), where the Court emphasized 
the absolute prohibition by the Constitution of "any" tax on imports. The principal 
case seems to indicate a tendency to balance the state and federal interests in this area 
in much the same manner as under the commerce clause. Cf. Northwestern States Portland 
Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959), note, 57 .MICH. L. REv. 903 (1959). But see 
Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board of Equalization, 329 U.S. 69 at 75-76 (1946). Some 
writers have previously called for a re-examination of Chief Justice Marshall's analysis 
of import immunity. See Trickett, "The Original Package Ineptitude," 6 COL. L. R.Ev. 
161 at 174 (1906); Foster, "What Is Left of the Original Package Doctrine," 1 SOL. L.Q. 
303 at 307-312 (1916). 
9 This argument was raised in Low v. Austin, note 8 supra, at 34, but rejected by 
a unanimous court on the ground that the Constitution prohibits all state imposts or 
duties on imports, and not just discriminatory taxes. Cf. Brown v. Houston, 114 U.S. 
622 (1885). 
10 See comment, 58 HARV. L. R.Ev. 858 at 867 (1945). In the principal case the dis-
crimination which would result in favor of imports over similar goods which were non-
imports was given as a reason for denying immunity. Prior to this case such discrimina-
tion was accepted as implicit in the Constitution. Hooven &: Allison Co. v. Evatt, note 
5 supra, at 667. This reversal further illustrates the apparent desire of the present Court 
to look at all the interests involved in the import immunity area. 
11 Gulf Fisheries Co. v. Madnerney, 276 U.S. 124 (1928). 
12 Principztl case, dissenting opinion at 572-573. 
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reason exists for engrafting such limitation upon goods entering the manu-
facturing process.13 
The principal .cases do raise the interesting problem of how an importer 
can determine whether goods which are imported for use in his manufactur-
ing process will enjoy immunity from state taxation. The existence of 
"original packages" here was deemed immaterial.14 Nor did the Court con-
sider as controlling the exact distance of the imports from the place of 
fabrication or the size of the piles of stored imports.15 Instead, the decision 
was based on the fact that the total of the imports were being "used" to 
supply the current operating needs of the manufacturer.16 In the Youngs-
town case the total of the imported ore used in this manner included only 
a three-month supply, although this represented all such ore stored at the 
manufacturing plant.17 Thus, the position which the Court might be ex-
pected to take in the future in this area is to allow state taxation whenever 
imported materials come to rest at the place of manufacture to be used in 
the normal operation of the business.18 It is only after this point has been 
reached that the imports can reasonably be said to supply the "current op-
erational needs" of the manufacturer. 
Stevan Uzelac 
13 The only merit which might -be found in using the "physical transformation" test 
to determine when a state might tax goods imported for manufacture is its relative 
certainty. But because such test is wholly arbitrary in its application it does not offer 
a satisfactory solution in reconciling the competing demands of the state and federal 
governments. 
14 Principal case at 548-549. 
15 Id. at 546-547. 
16 Id. at 549. 
11 Id. at 537. 
18 A tax at this point can also be supported on the ground that the "import stream" 
has ended, by way of analogy to the "export stream" theory which controls the state 
taxation of exports. See Empresa Siderurgica v. Merced County, 337 U.S. 154 (1949); 
comment, 47 CoL. L. R.Ev. 490 at 494-495 (1947). 
